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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CIT·Y,
A Municipal Corporation,
Appellant.
vs.
ANDREW REVNE,
Respondent.

Case
No. 6330

RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF
INTRODUCTION
The issue s-quarely put to this Court is whether-ornot:
1. The Municipal ordinance (in question) is within the express and implied power delegated to the City
of Salt Lake.

2. Assuming that the ordinance comes within the
delegated and implied power, is said ordiTiance constitutional1
It is counsels' position that the ordinance in question is not only outside the scope of the authority vested in Salt Lake City by the State Legislature of the
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State of Utah, but that the ordinance in question is unconstitutional.
AROOMENT
PROPOSITION I. THE ORDINANCE IN QUESTION IS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF THE
DELEGATED POWER TO LICENSE, TAX AND
REGULATE BARBER SHOPS.

In the Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 15-8-39 it is
stated that Municipalities may do as follows:
''·They may license, tax and regulate, (naming many businesses and occupations) barfber
shops, beauty parlors, etc.''
In the same compiled statutes, 15-8-84 it is stated
the municipalities may make the following rules:
''They may pass all ordinances and. rules,
and make all regulations, not repugnant to law,
necessa.ry for carrying into effe-ct or discharging
all powers and duties conferred by this chapter,
and such as are necessary and proper to provide
for the safety and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace
and good order, ·comfort and convenience of the
city and the inhabitants thereof, and. for the protection of property therein;; and may enforce
obedience to such ordinances with such fines or
penalties as they may deem proper, etc.''
In 19 Ruling Case Law, Section 75 it is stated by
the editors that:
"The legislature of a state, merely by establishing a municipal corporation does not delegate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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3
to such corporation the right to exercise .all the
governmental powers of the State within its territorial limits, or even such powers as are commonly exercised by a municipal corporation of
the same class. It i.s well settled that a municipal
corporation has only such powers as awe clearly
and unmistakably given to it by its charter or
by other acts of the legislature, and consequently
can exercise no powers not expressly granted to
it except those which are necessary or incident to
the powers expressly granted and those which are
indispensable to the ·declared objects and powers
of the corporation.''
Professor McQuillan, at Section 368 of Vol. I, of his
work, Municipal Corporations, says:
''The general, well-settled rule of construction is that a doubtful power is a power denied.
Any ambiguity or doubt arising out of the terms
employed in the grant of power must he resolved against the corporation and in favor of
the public."
In City of South Bend v. Chicago, South Bend &
N. I. Ry. Company, 179 Ind. 455; 101 N. E:. 628, (19,13),
the court, at page 457 acknowledged the above rule of
construction as follows:
''No incidental powers are implied except
those essential to the continued existence of the
municipality and to the accomplishment of the
purposes of its creation, and doubtful cla.ims of
authority are resolved against the corporation.
In the case at bar the only power delegated iby the
state to the municipality of Salt Lake City is the power
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to license, tax and regulate. It cannot be reasonably
implied from that express delegation that the city should
have the power to establish compulsory closing hours
for barber-shops. And if it cannot be reasonably implied, certainly under the rule of strict construction it
cannot 1he implied as a necessary incident to the express
delegation to license, tax, and regulate.
In State ex rei. Newman v. City of Laramie et al.
decided in 19'29 by the Supreme Court of Wyoming;
275 Pac. 106, the Wyoming ordinance provided:
''No 1barber shop shall be opened for business· earlier than 8 o'clock A. M. nor shall any
barber shop close later than 6 o '.clock P. M.
throughout the year, excepting on Saturdays and
days preceding the following legal holidays, etc.''
·T'he Supreme court of Wyoming held that the ordinance was not a reasonable exercise of the delegated
power given by the state to the municipality to license,
re·gulate, and control barber shops, and therefore dedared the provision to be void.
The Wyoming court duri·ng the course of its opinion
made the following interesting quotation from Freund
on Police Power:

"Freund on Police Power, Sec. 142 and See.
63 says that if a municipal ordinance, passed under authority conferred in general terms is foun(l
to be unreasonable, the court will say that the
legisla.ture never mtended to give authority to
pass it. . . . This is said to be particularly so
in regard to ordinances having relation to the
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liberty of the citizen or the rights of private
property.''
The \Yyoming court then distinguished the Falco
case, which will be referred to in detail later, as not being in point, because in that case the New Jersey State
legislature expressly authorized the municipalities to
provide opening and closing hours for 1barber shops.
The \Yyoming court finally concluded the opinion
by stating:
'' \V e are of the opiniOn that the proVIsion
complained of is not reasonable exercise of the
power to license, regulate, a;nd control barber
shops. It therefore is unauthorized and void.''
(All judges concurred).
In City of Alexandria v. Hall, Sup. Ct. of Louisiana,
1930, 171 La. 595; 131 So. 722, the court he1d invalid and
unconstitutional a municipal ordinance requiring barber shops to close at 6:30 P. M. except on legal holidays,
and said:
''It is our conclusion, therefore, that section
4 of ordinance 286 is not a reasonable exercise of
the power of the City to regulate and control
barber shops, and that this section is unconstitutional, null and void as a whole.''
In Knight, Chief of Police, v. Johns decided by the
Supreme Court of Miss., 137 So. 509, the court held. invalid a municipal ordinance requiring harher shops to
close at 6 :30 on week days, and said :
"Municipalities have only such authority to
adopt ordinances as is expressly or impliedly
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given them by the state, and we are referred to
no statute under which they are authorized to
regulate hours of labor; but assuming, for the
purpose of the argument, that they have authority to do so, this ordinance cannot be upheld
thereunder. 'Into every power given a municipality to pass by-laws or ordinances there is an
implied restriction that the ordinances shall be
reasonable, consistent with general law, and not
destructive of a lawful 1business' quoting Johnson v. Philadelphia, 94 Miss. 34; 47 So. 526.
PROPOSITION II. THE ORDINANCE REQUIRING BARBER SHOPS TO CLOSE AT A FIXED
TIME IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
While some of the cases involving closing hours for
barber shops have avoided the constitutional question
by deciding that such regulation is invalid as an unauthorized exercise of the delegated police power, other
cases have, even 1by way of dicta, as well as by direct
decision, held such municipal ordinances unconstitutional on the grounds that they are unreasonable, discriminatory and in direct contravention of the due process
,clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
In Vol. VII of American Jurisprudence, 1937, at
pages 617 and 618 the editors have this to say:
"The majority of cases which have considered the validity of ordinances containing provision requiring barber shops to be closed at a
certain fixed time on secular days have reached
the conclusion that such provision have no reasonable relation to the admittedly proper exercise of the police power in regulating the profesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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s£on of ba-rberi.ng. Any such regulations depend
for their Yalidity upon the nature of the business
sought to be regulated; that is, the nature of the
business must the such that the public health, morals, safety, or general welfare is, or might be,
affected by such business being permitted to remain open or continue after certain hours. With
regard to barbershops, such a regulation bea-rs
no reasonable relat·ion to the public health or gene ral ~eel fare; nor C(J/YI) it be supported on the
theory that it will aid the enforcement of proper
inspection regulations.

All the commentators and cases recognize one landmark case that has ruled contra to the above stated proposition. The case is Falco v. Atlantic City, decided in
1923, 99 N. J. L. 19; 122 Atl. 610. In that case the validity of an ordinance, similar to the one in question was
sustained. The court took the view that barber shops
afforded a fruitful opportunity for the spreading of
certain form of contagious diseases, and as a result
thereof were, from a health standpoint, subject to stringent regulations such as inspection, etc., and that to
allow barber shops to remain open to the pu'hlic at all
hours of the night might well be regarded as rendering
ready and adequate inspection inconvenient or difficult,
or even impossible, and consequently detrimental to public health.
It is significant that the municipal ordinance involved in this case was expressly authorized by state
legislatioiL Therefore the only question that could arise
was the constitutionality of the ordinance.
·The reasoning of this 1923 New Jersey case has
been either ignored or repudiated by subsequent CaliSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fornia, Washington, Wyoming, Utah, Georgia, Louisiana, Illinois, and Mississippi cases, and by a decision
decided by the Federal Courts.
The first case to be decided after the New Jersey
case was the landmark case of Chaires v. City of Atlanta, decided 1hy the Georgia Supreme Court in 1927;
164 Ga. 75·5; 139 S. E. 559. In that case the city of Atlanta passed an ordinance which, in the second section,
contained the provision that ''All barber shops in the
City of Atlanta shall hereafter be closed during the
week days at 7 o'clock." The court held that the ordinance was void on the ground that it was unreasonable, and said :
''We can reach no other conclusion than
that Sec. 2 of the ordinance is not based upon a
lawful -classification, and that it is discriminatory."
And again the court said :
''Persons engaged in the operation of barber shops are carrying on a perfectly lawful
business. In fact, the business may he regarded
as indispensable in the present development of
our civilization, if we are to regard the requirements of decency and cleanliness. There is ample evidence in the record to show that if the
barber shops are closed at 7 o'clock in the evenings and not permitted to open until next morning, there will be a large and numerous class of
citizens who cannot avail themselves of the service of barbers.''
Two years later a similar ordinance presented itSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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self to the Supreme Court of Wyoming in the case of
State ex rel. Newman v. City of Laramie et al., supra.
"\Vhile the "\Yyoming court hased its decision on the
grounds set out under Proposition 1, it was nevertheless anxious by way of dicta to give its opinion on the
Constitutional question, and to repudiate the reasoning
of the New Jersey case. The court had the following
to say:
''Unless the closing regulation in question
bears a real and substantial relation to the purpose of protecting the public from the spread of
disease, it stands on the same footing as any similar restriction on the right of a citizen to engage in a harmless and useful occupation.
The Wyoming court then quoted from State v. Ray,
131 N. C. 814; 42 S. E. 960, where the defendant was
charged with violation of an ordinance requiring the
closing of stores at 7:30 P. M. The court said:
"It must be admitted that the enforcement
of this ordinance would !he to deprive the defendant of his natural right-would be to interfere
with the free use and enjoyment of his property,
used in such a way as not to interfere with the
rights of others. It is not shown, nor is it suggested that defendant's keeping his store open after
7 :30 interfered with the rights of anyone else.
It was said that the other merchants were willing to close their stores at 7 :30 but the defendant was not, and the ordinance was passed to
compel him to do so, for the reason that if he
kept open the others would be compelled to do
so, or to give the defendant the benefit of the
trade of the town after that time. But did this
give the commissioners the right to close the
defendant's store 1
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It would seem that no legislative power exists
under our form of government and our ideas of
personal liberty, as to allow such interference with
one's rights of ownership and dominion over his
own property, except such interference be exercised for the protection and benefit of the public. When such interference is authorized, it
is under the doctrine of eminent domain, but it
is said to be under the police power of
the government. The attempted exercise of
the power in this instance is clearly not under
the doctrine of eminent domain, but it is said to
be under the police power of the government.
If the state could exercise such power (and we
do not say it could) can a municipal corporation
do so without express authority from the state.
The Wyoming court then quoted from Saville v.
Corless, 46 Utah 495, 151 Pac. 51 where the Utah Supreme Court considered a state law requiring commercial and mercantile houses to close at 6 P. M. The
court found several objections to the state law, but on
the question of Constitutionality said, as quoted by the
Wyoming Court:
"We think it also offends against constitutional right to enjoy, acquire, and possess property, the most valuable of which is that of alienation-the right to vend and sell. There are
things the sale of which may be restricted, regulated and controlled. But such legal interference must rest on the police power of the state
to promote or preserve public health, public
morals, public safety, public convenience, and
general welfare. The act here has no such purpose, and in no sense tends to promote or preserve public health, morals, peace, order, safety,
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convenience, comfort or welfare. It is but an
arbitrary and an unwarranted interference with
a merchant's business. One or a number of merchants may desire to close their stores at 6
o'clock. They may do that. But they, by legislation, cannot compel every other merchant to
close at the same hour. They can run their own
business, but not their neighbor's.''
After quoting the Utah case the Wyoming Supreme
Court distinguished and criticized the New Jersey case,
supra and said:
"In the case relied on (Fal·co case) the
statute plainly granted to the city the right to
fix hours of closing. The court thought it probable that this had been done in order to permit
the city to make ready and adequate inspections
that might otherwise be inconvenient, difficult, or
even impossilble. In the case at bar, the city's
power to fix closing hours does not arise from
such a specific grant, and must exist, if at all,
as an incident to the power to regulate. The
power has been exercised by prescribing sanitary
regulations, and by providing for inspections
to see that regulations are followed. Such provisions are conceded to be reasonable. There is
nothing in the statute to show that the Legislature thought the municipal corporation would
need to close the sliops in order more readily
to inspect them, nor is there anything on the face
of the ordinance to show that the closing of
shops at 6 o'clock in the evening was necessary
to facilitate inspection. There is nothing in the
agreed facts to show when or how inspections
are usually made. So far as we know, a barber
shop in operation after 6 o'clock can be as
readily and adequately inspected as one in operation 1before that hour.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The possible suggested difficulty is that inspectors cannot be on duty at all hours of the
night, without placing too great a burden on the
municipality. Perhaps, to those who are familiar with the times and methods of inspecting
barber shops, this reason would seem absurd.
If, for instance, in the administration of such an
ordinance an inspection is made of each shop once
a month, once a week, or even once each
day, there would seem to be no substantial
reason for the claim that the closing of
the shops at 6 in the evening was at all
necessary to facilitate inspection. In the absence of facts, we may not !he justified in any
definite assumption as to the frequency and nature of the inspections. We cannot, however, refrain from saying that the record on appeal shows
that, on an application for stay of execution,
the relator presented to the district court his affidavit, not contradicted, in which he states that,
so far as he knows, the city health officer has
never inspected his shop from May, 1927, when
the ordinance was passed, to November, 1927,
when the affidavit was made.
There is hardly any business that cannot to
some extent be regulated in the interest of the
public health or safety. Freund Sec. 143. Laws
prescribing sanitary regulations, requiring the
maintenance of safety devices and the labeling
of compounds, abound in the statutes of this and
·every other state. Many of them have been in
force for years. lVIost of thern provide for inspections, 1but it is only in the few recent cases
that we have cited that it has been supposed that
the right to inspect includes the right to restrict
the operation of the business by fixing closing
hours. It will readily be seen that a principle
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that would permit the closing of barber shops
as a reasonable exercise of the power to inspect
would permit a like restriction in regard to many
of the other businesses which are regulated unaer
the police power.
Following the \Yyoming case appears a decision
decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana on Dec. 1,
1930. There an ordinance was involved which required
barber shops to close at 6 :30 P. M. except on days
preceding legal holidays. ·The court in holding the
ordinance unconstitutional said: City of Alexandria v.
Hall, 171 La. 595 ; 131 So. 722 :
''The city of Alexandria has attempted to
maintain the constitutionality of the ordinance
by the introduction of medical experts who have
testified that the longer the hours of work are
the more run down tbecomes the system of the
barber, and the more susceptible he is to communicable diseases, and that thereby the public
health may become endangered.
In our opinion the public health is protected
by the provisions of the ordinance itself requiring
the inspection of tbarbershops, sterilization of instruments, and examination of all barbers suspected of having communicable diseases.
And again the court said:
"A minority of 20% of the barbers in the city
of Alexandria are opposed to the ordinance in
question. The clear purpose of the ordinance
is to make all barbers close their shops at the
same time. No thought of the health of the
community, in our opinion, was in the minds of
the barbers or of the City Council when Sec. 4
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was written into the ordinance closing all the
1barber shops during the week days at 6 :30 P. M.,
except on Saturdays when they must close at
9:00 o'clock P. M. Besides, adequate health provisions are taken care of in the uncontested provisions of the ordinance.
In 1933 a case involving compulsory closing hours
for barher shops appeared in the Federal Courts. The
case was McDermott v. City of Seattle, 4 Fed. Supp. 855.
In that ·Case an ordinance of the City of Seattle made it
unlawful to keep open a barber shop except from 6 A. M.
to 6 P. M. on week days, and from 6 A. M. to 7 P. M. on
days preceding holidays. The Federal court ruled the ordinance unconstitutional as taking property without due
process of law, and enjoined the City from enforcing it.
The court said :
''The ordinance takes from the plaintiff
trade for assumed public be:aefit, five hours, 6
P. M. to 11 P. M., every day except the days before Sundays and holidays when 4 hours are
taken-7 to 11 P. M.-approximately 1-3 of his
good will (property) without compensation or
due process. This the city has no power to do."
In Patton v. City of Bellingham et al, decided by
the Supreme Court of Washington one year after the
Federal case on Dec. 6, 1934, 38 Pac. (2nd) 365 the
court held inv·alid an ordinance prescribing hours for
opening and closing barber shops, on the ground that it
was unreasonable and arbitrary, and consequently void.
The court said :
''Confining ourselves, then, to the ordinance
and its effect, we have no hesitancy in saying,
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fir~t,

that the proYisions found therein, with reference to the inspection of barber shops, constitute a Yalid exercise of the city's police power,
and, as such, were reasonable and proper.''
The question then presents itself here whether the provision with reference to the time of
opening and closing barber shops is reasonable
and proper for the protection of the health and
general welfare of the public, or whether it is
unreasonable and arbitrary and an unlawful interference with the rights of the individual.
\Yhether the facts of a particular case warrant the assertion of police power is a judicial
question to be resolved by the courts. Bowes v.
Aberdeen, 58 \Yash. 535, 109 P. 3,69; Freund, Police Power, Sec. 142; 2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations (2nd Ed.) Sec. 599.
"\Yhile the interest of the public may be
likened unto an irresistable force which compels
where it requires, it nevertheless must, under
constitutional provisions, both federal and state,
respect the rights of the individual. While the
latter may not occupy the fixity of an immovruble object, they nevertheless have the protection
and sanction of the fundamental law of the land,
and they recede before no less a force than that
of public necessity.
To sustain the individual freedom of action
contemplated by the Constitution is not to strike
down the common good, but to exalt it; for surely the good of society as a whole cannot be better
served than by the preservation against arbitary
restraint of the liberties of its constituent mem'bers. '' (Quoting Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394).
The occupation of barbering is a lawful busi-
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ness, and, so far from being an obnoxious one,
it is now considered well-nigh indispensable. It
may be conceded, as we have already conceded,
that its relation to the public is such as the public
may he protected against the spread of communicable diseases and unsanitary practices. In so
far as the ordinance seeks to require that such
shops shall be operated in a clean and sanitary
manner, and by clean and competent barbers,
it is a wholesome measure and a valid exercise of
the police power. But in our opinion, the
avowed object of the ordinance bears no real or
substantial relation to the reasonable protection
of the public. It belongs, rather, in the category of unreasonable restrictions upon the right
of a citizen to engage in a useful and lawful
calling and to acquire and possess property and
to so use it as will not interfere with the rights
of others. The ordinance seeks not merely to
regulate a business, but to dictate its operation.
"The right to labor or earn one's living in
any legitimate field of industry or business is a
right of property, and any unlawful or unreasonable interference with or abridgement of such
right is an invasion thereof, and a restriction
of the liberty of the citizen as guaranteed by the
Consti,tution. '' (Quoting Yee Gee v. City and
County of San Francisco, ,D. C. 235 Fed. 757,
759.''

''It is contended 1by respondents that it is
necessary to limit the hours that a barber may labor, in order to prevent fatigue with its consequent hazards to the general public. It will be observed that the ordinance does not by its terms
limit the hours of labor at all, but merely attempts to limit the time within which a shop may
be kept open. If a shop remained open twenty-
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four hours of the d.ny, working two shifts of
six hours each, there would be no violation of
any regulation as to the hours of labor. It may
be true, as suggested in the testimony of some of
the witnesses that the enforcement of the ·Ordinance would serve to deflect a portion of appellant's business to other shops of the city,
and thus secure a fairer division. But that result, eYen though it should follow, is, in our
opinion, no valid reason for compulsory interference with the lawful business of the individual. If the principle thus contended for is upheld,
then the city council could limit the opening and
closing of shops to any period that it saw fit,
with the view of equalizing the incomes of all.
Such legislation, if upheld, might be the first installment of a plan or system by which all shops
would be required to pool their revenues for equal
division. In our opinion, the provisions of the
ordinance requiring the shops to close at specified hours bear no reasonwble relation to the public health or general welfare. The evidence in
the case, upon which findings of the court are
based, rests upon conjecture and not upon anything of a substantial nature.

''It is suggested by respondents in their
brief that the closing of the shops at· an early
hour wold facilitate inspection by the authorities and members of the board of inspection.
(Suggested by the reasoning in the Falco case,
supra). But certainly ample opportunity now
exists for reasonwble inspection, and certainly
the situation does not call for an absolute closing
of the shops in order that inspectors may go upon
the premises ; otherwise the right of inspection
would not be an incident of regulation, but would
be a lever by means of which the business would
be largely controlled.''
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'';T'he following cases have been called to
our attention, involving ordinances containing
provisions practically identical with those with
which we are here concerned. Falco v. Atlantic
City, State v. City of Laramie, City of Alexandria
v. Hall, Knight v. Johns, McDermott v. City of
Seattle. (All cited within this brief). The first of
these cases supports the contention of the respondents. The remaining five hold the ordinances in question either unconstitutional or else
unreasonruble and void. The cases differ somewhat in their reasoning and in the grounds on
which their conclusions are rested. All, HOWEVER, reach the same result. We have hereinabove adopted some of the statements made in
several of them, and therefore will not take
further space in analyzing or quoting from
them.''
"We are of the view that the provisions of
the ordinance relating to the hours of opening
and ·closing barber shops are unreasonable and
arbitrary, and consequently void. The decree of
the trial court is therefore reversed, with direction to enter in Hs place a decree permanently
enjoining the enforcement of the ordinance to
the extent last mentioned.''
After the Washington case appears a line of California cases, all decided in the years 19,35 and 1936. The
first of these, decided in 1935 by the Supreme Court of
California clearly shows the disposition of the California court on this identical question. The case is Ganley v. Claeys et al, Sup. Ct. of California, 1935, 40 Pac.
(2nd) 817. There the court held that an ordinance regulating barber shops, and providing that said ibarber
shops mu:;t be closed from 6 :30 P. M. until 8 A. M. of
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the following morning, except on Saturdays and days
preceding specified holidays \Yas void, having no reasonable relation to public health, which was the avowed
purpose a~signed for its adoption.
The court first cited from an earlier California
case, Ex P.arte Jentzsch, Sup. Ct. of Cal, 1896; 112 Cal.
468; 44 Pac. 803, where the court had held a barber
statute which required barber shops to close after
12:00 o'clock on legal holidays unconstitutional because
it was special, unjust, and unreasonable, working an
invasion of individual liberty, since it was based upon
no distinction to justify singling out that class of laborers.
After citing the J entzsch case with approval the
court proceeded to say :

''It is asserted by appellants, however, that
the present case is different from the one there
considered, because since that time, the state,
by the California Barber Law has acted to regulate the husiness of barbering and has defined
therein unsanitary practices and provided for the
appointment by the board of barbers of such inspectors as are necessary to carry out the provisions of the act. . . . It is said that the
inspectors are only on duty from 9 a. m. until
5 P. M. and that 90 per cent .of the complaints
from the public concern violations occurring
late in the evening or on Sundays or holidays ;
hence the ordinance is a health measure.
''However, a reading of the barber law will
convince the most skeptical that the state has
provided a complete plan or method for the regulation of the business and to prevent anyone
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from engaging therein who does not conform
to the standards therein announced.''
It should be pointed out at this point that the legislature of the State of Utah has provided similar sanitary measures for barber shops to those provided by
the California legislature.
In the Revised Statutes of Utah, 193'3, under the
heading SANITARY REGULATION OF CERTAIN
BUSINESSES, 35-1-12, it is provided:
"The State Board of Health may adopt
reasonwble rules and regulations prescribing
sanitary requirements for medical practitioners,
dentists, pharmacists, barber shops, barber
schools, cosmeticians and beauty shops, and
cause such rules and regulations to be printed
in suitable form and transmit a copy thereof to
each registered medical practitioner, dentist,
pharmacist, cosmetician, and proprietor or manager of a barber shop, barber school or beauty
shop.''
SANITATION IN CERTAIN PLACES OF BUSINESS, 35-1-13:
''The health commissioner may inspect during business hours the following named places
and objects for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the same are maintained in a clean and
sanitary condition, to-wit:
(1) The offices, equipment, tools, instruments, laboratories, appliances, line and supplies
of all medical practitioners, pharmacists, dentists,
barber shops, barber schools, cosmeticians and
1beauty shops.
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eNPROFESSION.AL CONDUCT DEFINED, 79-4-18:

''The department . . . The words '' unprofessional conduct'' as relating to barbers, students, apprentices and teachers are hereby defined to include:
(5) Keeping a shop, its furnishings, the
tools, utensils, or appliances used therein in unclean or insanitary condition.
(8) Conducting a school in an insanitary
manner or violating any rule of the department
regulating the conduct of barber schools.
(2) Practing when affiicted with a contagious or infectuous disease.
( 7) Violating any of the provisions of this
chapter, or any rule of the state board of health
prescribing sanitary requirements of barber
shops or schools.

It appears to counsel that it should he clear to the

court from the wbove statutory provisions that the
health of the citizens of the state is protected by sanitary regulations of barber shops by state legislation,
and in the proper and accepted manner, and that a
municipal ordinance providing for the compulsory closing hours, under the excuse that it is necess·ary for the
health of the community is entirely unwarranted, and
an obvious misuse of the delegated police power for
unconstitutional union legislation.
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ANALYSIS OF APPELLANT'S CASES AND
EVIDENCE
Before discussing the barber cases cited by appellant it seems sensible to address the court's attention
once again to the hasi'c inquiry in this case. It is:
Does the City Commission have the power to pass
the ordinance in question? If the Commission has such
power it must be one of three types. (1) A power that
·could be called inherent. ( 2) A power expressly given
to the City by a higher authority. {3) A power that can
be implied f-rom an express power given. These categories are sufficiently inclusive. Yet the pretended power of the City Commission to pass an ordinance requiring Barber Shops to close at a specific time cannot be
established under any of these headings. Counsel, to
clarify his position, will consider each in turn and show
that the City has presented neither reason nor authority which will sustain this court in establishing the
validity of this ordinance.
(1) The power is not inherent in the City to pass
this type of ordinance : It should not 'be necessary to
go to any great length to demonstrate that the commission has no inherent power to pass the ordinance.
The simple and well established fact is that no inherent
powers attach to a municipality created by the legislature, unless that municipality has a home rule charter
under State Constitutional provisions which provide for
such ~charters.
In the City of Chicago vs. M. & M. Hotel Co.,
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cance of the relationship between the State and Municipality as follows:
"The state leg·islature has inherent power
to pass any law it sees fit, unless it contravenes
some proYision of the State or Federal Constitutions The legislature may delegate all or a part
of its power to municipalities created by the legislature. Among the essential powers of the government are the taxing power, the police power,
and the power of eminent domain. These powers
belong to the State. ·They are essential to the
existence of government. The State cannot diYest itself of these powers and retain its sovereignty. Stripped of these great powers the
state would become subordinate to the munidpality or corporate entity in which such powers
were vested. The mere delegation of any of the
powers does not divest the state of its sovereign right to exercise them for itself or to take
them away from municipalities at its pleasure.
Counties, townships, school districts, cities, villages and other municipal and quasi-municipal
corporations are created under the authority of
the legislature. These, and all other local municipalities which are authorized by the legislature,
derive their existence and all their powers from
the legislature of the State creating them. There
is therefore no such thing as an inherent power
in any municipality which is created by legislative enactment.''
This Illinois court is simply stating the commonly
accepted view, and one to which ·counsel for the City
will no doubt accede.
While municipalities operating under Home Rule
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ers, they do have plenary powers in local affairs. Inasmuch as the City relies for authority on cases taken
from home rule cities counsel would like, briefly, to
point out the significant distinction that exists between
a home rule city, and a municipality of enumerated delegated powers, as exists in our own community and State.
In 43 Corpus Juris, page 275, Se-c. 294, under the heading: Home Rule Provisions, the following may be noted:
"In many jurisdictions the late tendency is
to secure to municipal communities freedom of
action in matters pertaining to local affairs. Numerous constitutional provisions have been enacted to safeguard municipal corporations from interference by the State legislature. . . . The ordinary effect of these ·constitutional provisions
under consideration is to empower the municipal
corporation to incorporate in its charter powers
and functions that are municipal or local in
character. In so far as ordinances or regulations
are enacted in the exer'cise of that power, they
supersede state laws in conflict therewith, and in
regard to such powers and functions the corporation is free from the control or supervision of the
legislature.
Obviously, such cities have a great deal more freedom than the ordinary -city of enumerated powers. And
of course the rule of construction employed in construing municipal legislation is entirely different from that
properly employed in the case at bar. In a Home Rule
City, once the problem of whether or not the ordinance
is local or not is decided, the only question that can
arise is whether or not the ordinance is constitutional.
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mining constitutionality is the liberal rule, one which
fayors validity, and determines all doubts in favor of the
enactment. That is probably why the Ohio cases cited
by the appellant in its brief talk only of constitutionality, and refrain from mentioning the strict delegated
powers.
Ohio, it should be pointed out, has a special constitutional provision providing for Home Rule Cities,
as set out in the cases cited. These cases are only authority for the proposition that the ordinance in ·question in this case is constitutional. 'They in no manner
whatsoever can have ,any bearing on the validity of the
ordinance passed by the City of Salt Lake as construed
under the theory of delegated powers. And that question, counsel frankly feels, is the vital and crucial problem that must be decided ·by this court.
(2) The power to provide compulsory closing
hours for barber shops is not expressly delegated to the
municipality.
The court need only ·consider the Revised Statutes
of the State of Utah, 1933, Sec. 15-8-9, wherein the
power given to the City is expressly stated as follows :
''They (cities) may license, tax and regulate,
etc. (listing a large number of business including
barber shops) ''.
It is perfectly clear that this statutory provision
does not expressly delegate to the city power to compel
barber shops to close at a specified hour.
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It should he noted at this point that one of the
cases relied upon by the city is a jurisdiction where the
State Legislature has in positive and clear terms delegated to the City express power to regulate the closing
hours of barber shops. The case is that of Fal,co v. Atlantic City, already cited by both plaintiff and defendant.
In that case the Legislature provided that cities were
allowed ''to pass, enforce, alter or repeal ordinances,
regulate the opening and closing of barber shops on
Sunday and holidays, also week days".
The Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Pearce v.
Moffatt, 9'2 P. 2nd 146, -cited by appellant, decided that
an ordinance passed by the City of Boise regulating
closing hours for !barber shops was ~constitutional.
The case is very interesting because it contains a
rather complete review of all prior decisions deciding
the question of the constitutionality of similar ordinances
and statutes. It is of limited applicability, however, as
the decision does not consider what ·Counsel and Judge
Schiller felt was the eontrolling question-that of ultra
vires acts of municipal corporations.
It appears that the State of Idaho-unlike the State
of Utah-has a legislative enactment providing for compulsory closing hours for barber shops. It then appears that the City of Boise passed an ordinance consistent with the state legislation, providing for compulsory dosing hours. The District Court in Boise found
the ordinance and statute unconstitutional and the plaintiff Pearce then brought this suit to enjoin prosecution
under the statute and ordinance.
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The court in a 2-3 divided op1n1on helJ that the
ordinance was constitutional and the statute was unconstitutional. All of the argument was limited to that
one question. Nothing was said about the question of
the theory of delegated powers and ultra vires acts of
municipalities. This is understandable in view of the
state legislation w·hich expressly authorizes such regulation, and in view of the manner in which the question
was presented to the ·court. The lower court had held
both the ordinance and statute unconstitutional, and the
appeal went to that question solely. Of course, if there is
a statute expressly authorizing such regulation then
the only question that can arise is whether such regulation is constitutional. But query, when the Idaho
Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional and
the ordinance constitutional didn't the question of ul;tra vires acts of municipalities presents itself, and
shouldn't the court have addressed itself to that problem on its own initiative~ ·That the court omitted to
do s-o is clear. All argument was confined to the question of constitutionality. The decision is also not very
clear on why the statute was unconstitutional and why
the ordinance was constitutional, unless it was because
the statute was discriminatory in confining the regulation of hours to cities of the first and second class.
Otherwise the constitutional question is identical in
both cases.
Of course, the two dissenting judges felt that the
ordinance and the legislation were unreasonable exercises of the police power and consequently unconsti-
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tutional enactments. This court will find their opinions
interesting, and counsel feels, should see in them
a much sounder line of reasoning than that followed by
the majority opinion. However, from the beginning
of this litigation ·counsel has felt that the real problem
which any competent court must decide is simply this:
Does the general authorization given by the state of
Utah to Salt Lake City to license, tax, and regulate
1barber shops, along with most every other business, give
Salt Lake City the implied power to impose upon neighborhood and down town barber shops alike a compulsory closing hour (not a minimum hour day) beyond
which they cannot conduct their private business. The
Idaho decision gives no assistance whatsoever on this
proposition. It simply indicates that on the constitutional question, the ·court could not agree. Certainly, in the
face of such serious constitutional problems, this court
·Cannot say that the State of Utah intended Salt Lake City
have implied power to do that about which there is serious doubt that the State of Utah could itself do.
Counsel has already pointed out at some length
in this Brief that the rule of construction as it relates
to implied powers of municipalities is a stdct rule, one
that is diametrically opposed to the rule indulged in
favor of constitutionality. Counsel for the City has
not cited a single case wherein the Court has implied
powers in a case analagous to the one at bar. On the
other hand, the Wyoming case, State ex rel. Newman v.
City of Laramie et al, quoted by defendant in his prior
Brief, is directly in point. In that case, the State leg-
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islation provided that the municipalities coultl license,
regulate and control 'barber shops. This delegation of
power is, if anyt bing, more broad and liberal than that
provided by the Legislature of the State of Utah. The
\Yyoming Supreme Court had no hesitation in determining that the power to close barber shops at a specified hour coufd not be implied from the grant of power
provided.
Counsel does not desire to ·comment on the evidence
produced in court by the City in its endeavor to support
the proposition that the municipal ordinance in question
is necessary for the health, peace and safety of the community. If anything, the redundant testimony offered
simply showed an over-zealous attempt on the part of the
·Barber Union to prop up a flimsy piece of class sponsored legislation. This evidence. alone shows most conclusively that the ordinance is arbitrary and special,
and is directed by Union forces to only one of the many
businesses which the municipality is given power to regulate. The Judge before whom this evic1ence was heard
had the following comment to make:
DECISION OF THE COURT CASE NO. 10743
AS SHOWN BY THE RECORD, 7TH
PARAGRAPH.

''This case, at the court's insistence, was
tried on its merits. A mass of testimony was
introduced by Salt Lake City for the purpose of
showing that an ordinance regulating the hours
of business of barber shops was necessary and
incident to the effective regulation of barber
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shops and in any event that the ordinance bore a
real relationship to the preservation of health
and safety in the ~community. Without reviewing the city's evidence in detail, suffice it to say
that it was not convincing to the Court. It disclosed no necessary or even incidental relationships between the power to regulate and. the fixing of hours of business nor was any realistic
connection shown between the health and safety
of the inhabitants of 8alt Lake City and the requirement that barber shops remain open only
during designated hours.''
If we have arrived at a stage in our society where
compulsory ·closing hours are desirable, the State Leglature, which is the policy forming ~body of our State
and Government should formulate a general law. Even
then our courts would have the grave question of constitutionality to determine. Certainly the City Commission, urged by Union leaders, should not be allowed
under our theory of municipal government to enact a
special law on a troublesome legal and social question.
Respectfully submitted,
McCULLOUGH & ASHTON,
Attorneys for Respondent.
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